概要
中国经济进入短周期底部区域，但对强劲复苏应降低预期：未来数月，随着经济活动出现明显而广谱的减速，政策的支持力度也将加强，中国经济将逐步进入短周期底部,?中国正处于这样一个关键时刻：在希望刺激的同时又不愿意显得背离几年前启动的结构性改革的初衷。其实，雾霾已悄然归来。与此同时，美国的短期经济周期已经见顶。2019年里，其盈利增长将继续放缓，并将继续扰动海外市场。
The Chinese economy has entered the bottom of the short-cycle, but expectations for a strong recovery should be lowered: in the coming months , as economic activity slows sharply and widely, policy support will intensify, and the Chinese economy will gradually enter the bottom of the short-cycle? China is at a critical juncture: it wants to stimulate, but does not want to appear to deviate from the structural reforms initiated a few years ago.
中国经济里的三张资产负债表在恶化，但杠杆高度尚未到临界点：经济复苏的力度受制于系统性高杠杆。幸运的是，我们自下而上的汇总数据显示：1）家庭房贷支付占可支配收入的比例很高，相当于2007年和2012年时的水平，但还不至于崩溃；2）地方政府偿债能力到2020年下半年前不会明显恶化，中央政府偿的资产负债表坚如磐石；3）民营企业的偿债能力虽然有所下降，但仍大致合理。因此，在公共和私人部门之间增加或转移杠杆的空间是存在的。尽管刺激措施边际效用在递减，但仍将奏效
Three balance sheets in the Chinese economy are deteriorating, but the leverage level has not yet reached the critical point: the strength of the recovery of
上证指数的交易区间在稍低于2,000点到2,900点之间；至少六个月以上运行于?2,350点上方；但触底是一个漫长的过程；香港股市将跑输：我们的模型预测交易中值区间与最近的最低点2,450点基本一致，2,450也是我们两年多前就预测了的市场底部。区间下沿略低于2,000点的水平对应的是贸易战恶化的风险。这是一个风险情景。触底是一个过程，而非一个点。从历史上看，中国股市“磨底”可以持续一年以上。
The trading zone of the
如贸易战恶化，供应侧改革和房地产调控的基调将被弱化：股市的暴跌使和大豆期货交易暗示贸易战的短期影响在很大程度上已经反映在价格里。进一步降准、降息和减税、窗口指导贷款、放松房地产限制以及减弱供应侧改革力度都有可能。对于中国巨大市场的外资准入也将进一步放开。
If the trade war deteriorates, the tone of supply-side reform and real-estate regulation will be weakened: the collapse of the stock market and the short-term impact of the soybean futures trade suggest that the short-term effects of the trade war are largely reflected in prices. Further reduction, interest and tax cuts, window lending, easing of real-estate restrictions, and easing of supply-side reforms are all possible.
如贸易战恶化，政策应对也将对等加强。最近市场的复苏已抢跑了这些政策组合。当到其时政策推出后市场却反应平淡，那么必须铭记：我们管理的是经济，而非市场价格。风暴来或不来，大海仍在那里，不增不减。
If the trade war worsens, the policy response will be symmetrical. The recent recovery of markets has taken away the combination of these policies. When policies are introduced, the market reacts lightly, bearing in mind that we manage the economy, not market prices.
一、中美贸易战的影响?–?喘息之机
The impact of the Chinese-American trade war?
自贸易战开始打响，中国股票市场便开始如负重荷。但作为贸易战的始作俑者，美国市场并未真正感受到这种影响——直到最近，中国经济放缓变得更为明显，而美国经济的短周期也逐步见顶。现在的问题是：在经历了30%以上的暴跌、并被列为今年全球表现最差的市场之一，中国股市是否已经消化了贸易战的影响?
But, as the starter of the trade war, the US market did not really feel that impact – until recently, China’s economic slowdown became more pronounced, and the US economy’s short-term cycle peaked. The question now is: has China’s stock market absorbed the effects of the trade war when it experienced a sharp fall of more than 30% and was listed as one of the world’s worst performers this year?
为了回答上述问题，我们计算了上证综合指数滚动40周对数回报率。我们想要考察上证2018年的暴跌，和历史上几次显著的熊市相比，是否已经进入了底部区域。可以看到，在2018年股市暴跌后，这个回报指标已跌至2001年美国经济萧条时间，2005年上证综指跌破1000点以及2011年欧洲主权债务危机期间的水平。然而，这次暴跌的深度还不及2008年全球经济危机时的跌幅，以及2015年中国股市泡沫破灭时的程度（图1）。因此，除非明年的贸易战进一步恶化，我们可以说近期市场价格的变动已经很大程度上反映了贸易战的影响，以及中国经济周期的减速。
In response to the above questions, we calculated the 40-week logarithmic return on the previous composite index. We wanted to examine whether the collapse in 2018, compared to several prominent bears markets in history, had reached the bottom zone. As can be seen, after the stock market crash in 2018, the return indicator had fallen to the 2001 US economic depression, and in 2005 it had broken 1,000 points and levels during the 2011 sovereign debt crisis in Europe. However, the magnitude of the collapse was not as high as the global economic crisis in 2008 and the extent to which the Chinese stock market bubble broke down in 2015 ( to
图1:?市场回报极度低迷表明股票价格已经计入贸易战短期的影响。
The extremely low market returns of indicate that stock prices have been factored into the short-term impact of the trade war.
一种计量贸易战影响的方法，就是观察大豆期货的价格。这是因为大豆在美国对华出口贸易的重要性，以及中西部农业州对于美国大选的影响力。我们注意到，尽管贸易战近期似乎在恶化，美国大豆期货价格已不再创新低（图2）。这个观察显示了当前市场价格似乎已经计入了贸易战的短期影响。除非贸易战开始持续恶化，上证指数和美国大豆期货皆侧面反映了市场价格结构里贸易战的短期内喘息之机。双边重新开始对话是一个积极的信号。
One way to measure the impact of the trade war is to observe the price of soybean futures. This is because of the importance of soybeans in US exports to China, and the influence of the Midwest State of Agriculture in US elections.
图2:?美国大豆期货价格不再创新低。
The prices of American soybean futures are no longer low.
二、中国经济里的三张资产负债表
我们的经济周期模型显示，鉴于财政刺激和货币宽松的政策的实施，在未来几个月里，中国经济的短周期将逐步进入底部区间。我们的周期模型还显示美国的短经济周期正在见顶，并将在短期内继续扰乱海外市场。（请参照2018/09/03的报告《洪灝：中美周期的冲突》）
Our economic cycle model shows that, in view of fiscal stimulus and the implementation of monetary easing policies, the short cycle of the Chinese economy will gradually enter the bottom zone in the coming months. Our cycle model also shows that the short economic cycle in the United States is at its peak and will continue to disrupt overseas markets in the short term. (Please refer to the report : conflict in the Chinese-American cycle > / strong > )
当经济周期接近向上拐点之前，这意味着经济中的消极因素已经图穷匕见。在这个时点，我们会看到，尽管利率下降，但信贷扩张已经放缓至名义经济增长水平之下。经济活动，尤其是中国的房地产建设活动的增长，正逐渐地停滞不前；消费疲软，存货水平低下。作为最受关注的经济活动晴雨表，股市也表现低迷。中国正处在这样的一个关键时刻。
At this point, we will see that, despite falling interest rates, credit expansion has slowed below nominal economic growth. Growth in economic activity, particularly in real estate construction in China, is slowly stagnating; consumption is weak; and stock levels are low.
然而，一个经济周期如果要走出低谷，往往需要政府政策的帮助。挑战越大，政策支持的力度就需要越高 --- 就像现在一样。政策有效的必要条件是，政府仍然有刺激的余地，而私人部门的资产负债表里，杠杆还没有被加到无以为继的地步。简而言之，在公共和私人部门的资产负债表里，仍有转高移杠杆负担的空间。
However, an economic cycle often requires the help of government policies if it is to get out of the valley. The greater the challenge, the stronger the policy support -- as it is now -- is needed. The necessary condition for policy effectiveness is that there is still room for government stimulus, and leverage has not yet been added to the private sector’s balance sheets.
在以下的部分，我们将研究中国经济里不同部门杠杆的情况。
In the following part, we will look at the leveraging of different sectors of the Chinese economy.
2.1?家庭：中国房地产泡沫–?一个不同的视角
2.1? Family: China’s real-estate bubble? > a different perspective
中国房地产是一个泡沫吗？对于中国房地产泡沫的争论一直没有定论。泡沫论者们，包括笔者自己在内，曾一度用极低的租金收益率对比抵押贷款利率，高比例的房地产价格对比收入，以及空置率去证实他们对于房地产泡沫的看法。尽管有这些论据有理有据，但过去二十年里房地产的价格却一骑绝尘。虽然房地产是一种长久期的资产，因此选择退出的时机很困难，但这样强势的价格表现暗示着当前的主流观点可能有失偏颇。
China’s real estate is a bubble. The debate on China’s real-estate bubble has been inconclusive.
随着中国经济放缓，房地产价格下行的压力愈发明显。专家们争论的焦点已经转向高房价是否已经导致中国家庭的杠杆率提升至高得不可持续的水平，并且影响了居民消费水平。最终，杠杆率高得无以为继将很可能导致房地产泡沫的破灭。
As China’s economy slows, the pressure on real-estate prices has become more pronounced. Experts have debated whether the shift to high housing prices has led to an increase in the leverage rate of Chinese households to unsustainable levels, and has affected consumption levels.
除了那些衡量房价承担能力和家庭资产负债表健康状况的传统指标之外，我们认为，对中国家庭的偿债能力跨时间和地区的考察可能更能说明问题。如果中国家庭可以负担得起他们房贷的月供，那么只要购房回报率超过抵押贷款利率，采用杠杆的形式进行房地产投资其实是可以合理的。此外，考虑到不同地区的房地产市场存在显著差异，因此考察房地产市场也应该因地而异。
In addition to the traditional indicators that measure home price affordability and household balance sheet health, we believe that a time- and regional survey of the solvency of Chinese households may be more illustrative. If Chinese households can afford their monthly mortgages, it is reasonable to use leverage to invest in real estate as long as the return on home purchases exceeds the mortgage rate.
图3: 35城的可支配收入增长快于房贷还款月供
Figure 3: 35
我们发现从国家层面上来讲，家庭可支配收入的增长快于房价的增速。房贷还款占家庭总收入的39%。这个百分比已经攀升至类似2007年和2011年时的高度。而这两年随后的那年都分别是中国经济比较困难的一年（图3）。当下，在美国的利率开始从历史的底部上升的时候，其对应的指标为21%。这个比较可以理解为中国家庭似乎负债累累。但和香港的56%相比较就显得有些不值一提了。在1997年效果房地产泡沫时期，香港的这个比率甚至突破了100%。因此，中西方文化的差异应该是导致房贷负担大相径庭的重要原因（图4）。
At the national level, we found that household disposable income grew faster than housing prices. Housing repayments accounted for 39 per cent of total household income. This percentage had risen to levels similar to those in 2007 and 2011. These two years later were a difficult year for the Chinese economy (`strong' figure > strong3 > / strong > / strong > ). At this point, when interest rates in the United States started to rise from the bottom of history, the target was 21 per cent. This can be understood to seem to be heavily indebted to Chinese households.
图4:?香港/美国房贷负担
Figure 4:? Hong Kong//strang>/United States mortgage burden
在一些合理假设的基础上，我们采用了用同样的计量方法去考量35个主要中国城市的房贷负担（图5只显示了一些重要的城市。剩余的城市请参照报告文末附录）。我们发现，2005年以来，35座主要城市中只有16个城市的家庭可支配收增速快于房价增速。一线城市里除了广州以外，所有城市的房价上涨的速度都超过了家庭可支配收入的增速。因此，当考虑到不同地区的差别，如果房价增速继续快于收入，那么中国房地产泡沫将成为骆驼背上的稻草。
On the basis of reasonable assumptions, we have applied the same measure to take account of the mortgage burden in 35 major Chinese cities (figure
图5:部分主要城市的房贷负担（完整的城市图表详见附录）
Figure 5: The mortgage burden in some of the major cities (a complete urban chart is provided in the appendix)
综上，我们得出结论为中国家庭的房贷负担相对于可支配收入的增长已经恶化到与2007年和2011年相持平的水平。那两年的随后两年，2008年以及2012年，都是房地产市场和经济困难的年份。这些年份还与美国经济短周期的下行年份一致（我们在后面的报告会详细讨论美国经济的短周期）。总体而言，中国家庭资产负债表的杠杆很高，而且正在恶化。但是从偿债能力上判断，似乎还未及崩溃瓦解的边缘。
In summary, we conclude that the increase in the mortgage burden of Chinese households relative to disposable income has worsened to levels consistent with those of 2007 and 2011. The following two years, 2008 and 2012, were real-estate markets and economic difficulties. These years are also consistent with those of the short-cycle of the United States economy (the short-cycle of the United States economy is discussed in detail in our subsequent reports).
2.2?地方政府负债问题
2.2? Local government liabilities >
随着不断增加的负债问题，地方政府可以继续维持正常运作吗？这个问题一直困扰着投资者们。从追溯历史的角度上讲，自2009年国家拨款了4万亿以刺激经济增长，地方政府债务危机早在2010年开始首度浮出水面。我至今还记得当时带领着一个大型的投资者团队对这个问题做尽职调查，长江上下游城市的场景都历历在目。最近，随着一些新闻标题报道一些乡县政府发放公务员工资遇到了困难，政府负债问题再次受到了关注。
From a historical point of view, the state has allocated $4 trillion since 2009 to stimulate economic growth, and the local government debt crisis has surfaced for the first time since 2010. I remember today that a large team of investors was leading a due diligence exercise on this issue, and that the cities of the Yangtze River and the downstream have been visible.
分析地方政府负债的挑战在于其透明度。首先，真实可靠地数据是很难搜集到的。同时，地方政府融资平台、地方政府所有的、或与，以及对地方政府关联公司的间接债务担保而产生的隐性债务进一步使问题错综复杂。
The challenge in analysing local government liabilities lies in their transparency. First, it is difficult to collect reliable and reliable data.
我们的考量方法则是利用个债数据（包括地方政府债券和地方政府融资平台债），从下而上汇总地方政府的显性债务。这些数据包括了本金到期和利率支付的信息。然后，我们把这些数据自下而上的汇总与各种新闻报道和国家审计的数据相比较，来验证它的合理性。显然，我们的分析并不包括或有的隐性债务。相对于3%的国际标准来说，我们中央政府的财政赤字水平目前还处于2.7%。这是一个较低的赤字水平，所以我们把分析的重点聚焦在地方政府债务问题上。我们的分析是作为最佳情景考虑的（图6）。
Our approach is to use individual debt data (including local government bonds and local government financing platform debt) to aggregate the explicit debt of local governments from the bottom up. These data include information on principal maturity and interest rate payments. We then compare the bottom-up aggregation of these data to various news reports and national audit data to verify its validity. Obviously, our analysis does not include contingent hidden debt. The central government’s fiscal deficit level is currently 2.7 per cent, a low deficit level compared to 3 per cent of international standards, so we focus our analysis on local government debt. Our analysis is considered as the best scenario ( map6).
在扣除包括提供公共安全和教育等固定支出的后，并同时考虑到其债务到期的时间表，我们发现地方政府在2019年将出现小幅的、缺乏资金偿债的情况。由于过去三年发行的大量债券到期，在2020年的下半年地方政府债务问题将严重恶化。我们可以假设这些债券将在2020年到期之时将通过发新债置换，但这种策略将进一步提高地方政府的杠杆。如果我们假设这些债券能够通过中央政府转移支付来偿还，那么我们的中央财政赤字将被提升至近4%。
After deducting fixed expenditures, including the provision of public security and education, and taking into account the maturity schedule of its debt, we find that local governments will have a small, unfunded debt service in 2019. As a result of the large number of bonds issued that have expired over the past three years, local government debt will deteriorate significantly in the second half of 2020. We can assume that these bonds will be replaced by new debts by 2020, but this strategy will further enhance local government leverage.
如果我们假设债券在到期时的将通过发行新债置换的话，那么地方政府的偿债能力将大幅度提高。即使如此，地方政府在2020年下半年为其负债去融资仍将是一个巨大的挑战。不论如何，地方政府负债终将面临挑战。但幸运的是，目前我们暂时还不会受到该方面的威胁。
Even so, local governments will remain a huge challenge in financing their liabilities in the second half of 2020. In any case, local governments’ liabilities will eventually be challenged.
图6:?地方政府偿债能力将在2020年下半年显著减弱
Figure 6:?
2.3?企业债务问题
近期，有人担心，如果市场动荡持续，中国的民营企业可能会“跌回”国企。许多批评指出，制造业里国企和民营企业财务状况严重两极分化，证明了民营企业在夹缝中步履维艰。
Recently, there have been concerns that private enterprises in China may “fall back” if market instability persists. Many criticisms point to a serious polarization in the financial position of public and private enterprises in manufacturing, which is evidence of the difficulties that private enterprises are struggling with in the middle of the gap.
尽管这些担忧并非空穴来风，制造业只是正在向消费转型的中国经济的组成部分之一。此外，在由许多上游大宗商品生产商组成的资本密集型行业里，中国有企业拥有得天独厚的先天优势。这些行业公司的实力已经在供给侧改革中进一步加强。因此，只发展制造业就好比持管窥天，用锥指地，不亦小乎。
Despite these concerns, manufacturing is only one of the components of China’s economy that is in transition to consumption. Moreover, in capital-intensive industries, comprising many of the major upstream commodity producers, Chinese firms have a unique pre-existing advantage.
通过测量汇总每一个公司的EBITDA/净利息覆盖率，我们分析得出上市企业的负债偿还能力。我们自下而上汇总上市公司的财务数据，并按所有权结构对其进行分组。事实上，我们发现当民营企业在某种程度上减弱的同时，国有企业和地方政府的偿还债务能力却在近五年来有所改善。尽管如此，私营企业的净利息覆盖率仍然在7倍左右，即相对于任何标准都在一个合理水平（图7）。
By measuring the EBITDA/net interest coverage of each company, we analyse the debt-paying capacity of listed enterprises. We aggregate the financial data of listed companies from the bottom up and group them according to the ownership structure. In fact, we find that while private enterprises have somewhat weakened, the debt-servicing capacity of State-owned enterprises and local governments has improved over the last five years. Despite this, net interest coverage by private enterprises remains about seven times higher, that is, at a reasonable level in relation to any criteria (
近期，许多人担心市场下行导致股权质押爆仓。在我们的量化分析发现，自2005年初起，股权质押的绝对量和相对于市场总市值的比率明显提高，即使2015年股市泡沫破裂，也只是暂时压抑了股票质押增长的速度。市场质押总比直到2018年3月呈上升趋势，随后锐减。这显示了随着市场暴跌加速，股票质押的补仓需求也随之增加–?对于当时市场的下行，在这个关头追加保证金就像踩油门加速一样，并加剧整个市场的波动。
In our quantitative analysis, it was found that since the beginning of 2005, the absolute and ratio of stock pledges to the total market value of the market had increased significantly, and even the bursting of the stock market bubble in 2015 had only temporarily depressed the growth of stock pledges. Market pledges had been on the rise until March 2018, and had then declined sharply. This showed that, with the rapid collapse of the market, demand for stock pledges increased – as did demand for stock pledges to replenish them.
然而，鉴于整个新兴市场自一月底就开始明显承受抛压，并且自从2015年股市泡沫破灭后市场质押份额比也随着市场的修复一直在增长，股权质押贷款不见得就是熊市形成的原因，尽管其的确加剧了熊味。与此同时，美国市场的大幅波动也是雪上加霜?--?这是中美国经济短周期运行交汇产生下行合力的结果。我们在报告接下来的部分将继续讨论中美经济的短周期。
However, given that the emerging markets as a whole have been subject to significant puncture since the end of January, and that since the collapse of the stock market bubble in 2015 the share of the market pledge has been growing as the market has been repaired, equity pledge lending has not always been the cause of the bear market’s emergence, although it has indeed increased its smell. At the same time, large fluctuations in the United States market have been compounded by the combined effect of short-term cycles in the United States, which we will continue to discuss in the next part of the report.
图7:?上市公司EBITDA /净利息覆盖率
Figure 7: net interest coverage for listed companies EBITDA /
三、中美经济的短周期
III. Short-cycle Central American economy
?“我们从历史中唯一汲取的教训，就是我们不会汲取任何历史教训。”—黑格尔
"The only lesson we've learned from history is that we don't learn anything from history."
3.1?最迫切的问题
3.1 ?
美国经济存在着一个?3.5?年周期（图8），而中国的周期则是?3?年。在以下的篇幅里，我们将用基于量化分析的图表来说明中美经济里周期性的特征。
The US economy has one? 3.5? The Chinese cycle is? 3. In the following pages, we will use graphs based on quantitative analysis to describe the cyclical characteristics of the US-China economy.
在我们第一篇关于量化经济周期的、题为《中国经济周期权威指南》的论文在2017 年三月发表后，我们应邀在中国最负盛名之一的大学里，讲授了一节关于经济周期的公开课。当时，一位著名的杰出经济学家打趣道：“你能用这个周期理论来交易吗？你怎么能确定下次还会是一样的呢?”
After our first paper on the Quantified Economic Cycle, entitled "The Authoritative Guide to China’s Economic Cycle" was published in March 2017, we were invited to give an open lecture on the Economic Cycle at one of China’s most prestigious universities. At that time, a prominent economist made fun: “Can you trade with this cycle theory? How can you be sure that it will be the same next time?”
诚然，预测是困难的，尤其是要预测未来的时候。虽然所有的模型都是错的，但仍然有一些模型是有用的。任何周期性模型的意义都在于评估和预测许多人难以察觉的潜在趋势，以及拐点的大致时间。这样的预测虽然没有必然兑现的保证，却提高了交易盈利的可能性。顺便说一句，2017 年十二月初，我们发表了题为《2018年展望：无限风光》的 2018 年展望报告。其中偏保守悲观的观点正是基于中国 3 年周期的最后下降阶段。这个偏空的意见与当时普遍乐观的共识相悖。自一月底见顶以来，上证综指已经下跌了约30%。现在最迫切的问题是：何处是底?
Admittedly, predictions are difficult, especially when it comes to predicting the future. While all models are wrong, there are still models that are useful. The meaning of any cyclical model is to assess and predict potential trends that are difficult for many to detect, as well as the approximate timing of the turning point.
图8: 美国经济的短周期与上证A股市盈率的比较。美国经济的短周期已见顶。
Figure 8 of
3.2?美国经济的短周期
3.2? short-cycle of the United States economy
?“在经济学中，我们所说的周期，通常指的是7到11?年的商业周期……我们都同意称之为‘中波’。最近有证据表明，大约3?年半的、更短的周期很可能也存在……中波的时长至少介于7?到11?年之间”。——《经济的长波》，尼古拉·康德拉季耶夫
? “In economics, what we refer to as a cycle is usually a business cycle of 7 to 11? > > > > we all agree to call it
在图9中，我们使用调整后的标普500?指数每股收益来衡量美国经济的短期波动。我们的图表分析显示，美国经济显然存在一个3.5?年的周期。两个3.5年的短周期构成了一个完整的、从谷底到下一个谷底的7?年的中周期。我们在图9中观察到以下情况:
In figure
1)?自1994?年以来，有6?个3.5?年的短周期和3?个7?年的中周期(如图表xxx底部时间轴上方的蓝色和红色弧线所示)。最近的两个完整中周期分别是2001?年12?月至2008?年12?月，以及2008?年12?月至2015?年12月，而2005?年中和2012?年中分别为周期性间歇期。
1)? Since 1994? there have been 6? 3.5? short? and 3? 7? mid-year cycles (as shown by the blue and red arc above the bottom time axis of chart xx). The last two full mid-periods are 2001? December? 2008? December 2008 and 2008? December 2015? December 2015, and mid-2005? and mid-2012? respectively.
2)?在7?年中周期内的第一个3.5?年短周期里，当短周期结束上升趋势，然后下行穿破中周期时(以蓝色圆圈标记)，往往伴随着区域性危机?(以蓝色阴影时间段表示并标注)。例如，1997?年亚洲金融危机和1998?年俄罗斯违约，以及2011?年欧洲主权债务危机和美国历史性的主权评级下调。当前在土耳其和阿根廷发生的危机似乎正是这种性质的中期危机。
2) The first 3.5 in the mid-year cycle? In the short-year cycle, when the short-cycle ends the upward trend and then goes down through the middle cycle (marked with a blue circle), it is often accompanied by a regional crisis (expressed and marked with a blue shadow period). For example, the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and Russia’s default of 1998 and the European sovereign debt crisis of 2011 and the historical United States sovereignty rating of 2011, the current crisis in Turkey and Argentina seems to be a mid-term crisis of this nature.
3)?在7?年中周期的下半场，当3.5?年短周期和7?年中周期都同时开始下行时(以红色圆圈表示)，往往会发生规模更大的危机。例如，2000?年的互联网泡沫的破裂、2001?年的9-11?恐怖袭击和美国经济衰退，以及2008?年的全球金融危机(以红色阴影时期显示和注释)。尽管很少有人讨论，但其实2001?年和2008?年美国股市的跌幅差不多——都腰斩了。这两次深刻的危机给了我们合理的时间锚，以计算周期的持续时间。上升趋势对资产价格的积极影响比下行趋势的负面影响持续的时间往往更长。
In the second half of the mid-year cycle, 3.5? The short-year cycle and 7? The mid-year cycle start down at the same time (expressed in the red circle), there are often larger crises. For example, the bursting of Internet bubbles in 2000 and 2001, the terrorist attacks in 2001 and the recession in the United States, and the global financial crisis in 2008 (in the red-shadowed period and the notes). Although rarely discussed, both 2001 and 2008 saw similar declines in the United States stock market. These deep crises have given us a reasonable time anchor to calculate the duration of the cycle. The positive impact of the upward trend on asset prices is often longer than the negative impact of the downside trend.
4)?历史表明，全球市场面临的挑战有可能是11?年中周期的最后一段。这个中周期包括3?个3.5?年的短周期，自2009?年初开始、至2019?年初结束。但这也可能是从2016?年初开始的，一个为期7?年的中周期内的第一个3.5年短周期。这个稍短的7?年中周期包括了两个3.5?年的短周期。如是，未来出现动荡的级别将远没有如果是因为11?年中周期结束所带来的动荡那么严重。
History shows that the challenge facing the global market is likely to be 11? The last part of the mid-year cycle. This medium cycle consists of 3? 3.5? short-year cycles, starting at the beginning of 2009? and ending at the beginning of 2019.
5)?未来几个月里，中国自身的3?年经济周期正进入最后下行阶段。我们的模型结论显示，中国周期的这一下行阶段恰好与美国3.5?年短周期的后期下行阶段相一致(4Q18 - 1Q19)。我们将在本报告的后面部分更新我们的中国经济周期模型。这将是动荡之季。尽管中国股市已经便宜了许多，这一周期阶段的时间巧合很可能是当前中国股市难以寻底的原因。
5. In the coming months, China’s own 3-year economic cycle is entering its final phase. Our model findings show that this phase of the Chinese cycle coincides with 3.5 in the US. The latter stage of the short-term cycle (4Q18-1Q19). We will update our model of the Chinese economic cycle later in this report. This will be a turbulent season.
图8是我们使用彭博图表工具绘制的。虽然它合乎常理，并具有视觉上的冲击，我们需要量化建模以验证它的严密性。从图9到图11，我们使用调整后的每股收益的月度数据来模拟美国经济的短周期和中周期。我们的量化模型可以清晰地展示，过去20 多年美国经济的3.5 年短周期，以及包含了两个3.5 年短周期的7年中周期。
然后，我们将标普500指数、工业产出、产能利用率、经济领先指标、资本支出计划和就业等美国宏观经济变量与美国经济周期指标叠加在一起。读者可以清晰地看到这些变量与周期指标之间的紧密联系。
Then we add the macroeconomic variables of the United States, such as the index of 500, industrial output, capacity utilization, economic leadership indicators, capital spending plans and employment, to the United States economic cycle indicators. Readers can clearly see a strong link between these variables and cyclical indicators.
值得注意的是，市场价格、产出、成交量或调查之间的这些价量的相关性证明了我们的周期模型的有效性：这里定义的周期性并不能简单地当作偶然性而打消。所有这些重要的时间序列都显示了相似长度的、清晰界定的时间久期。尽管这些数据经过了复杂的统计和数学处理，但它们的重要转折点在很大程度上都是一致的。
It is worth noting that the correlation of these prices between market prices, output, turnover, or surveys proves the validity of our cyclical models: the cyclicality of the definition here cannot simply be eliminated as an accident. All these important time series show similar lengths of clearly defined time periods.
这些周期序列中鲜有普遍存在的、偏离一般规则的情况。即使出现偏离根本趋势的情况，这种偏离往往只是会加速或阻碍其自身运行的势能，而不是根本趋势的本身。这种罕见的偏差本身就是值得注意的、周期存在的证据。
There are few widespread deviations from the general rules in these cycles. Even in the case of deviations from the fundamental trend, such deviations tend to be merely the power that accelerates or hinders their own operations, not the fundamental trend itself. Such rare deviations are in themselves noteworthy evidence of the existence of cycles.
事实上，美国经济的3.5 年短周期与中国经济的3 年周期是基本一致的。我们在之前发表于2017年三月的、题为《中国经济周期权威指南》的报告中量化证明了中国经济的三年周期。这两个经济体中由两个短周期组成的6至7年的中周期也是基本一致的。中美两国短周期以及中周期的交汇必然对经济和市场表现，以及政策的选择产生深远影响。
In fact, the 3.5-year short-cycle of the US economy is largely consistent with the 3-year cycle of the Chinese economy. The three-year cycle of the Chinese economy was quantified in our previous report, published in March 2017, entitled A Guide to China’s Economic Cycle Authority.
图9:量化的美国经济3.5 年短周期和标普500指数的对比。美国经济的短周期已经见顶。
Figure 9: Quantified United States economy 3.5 short-term comparison of the standard 500
3.3?实际观察和政策选择
3.3? Practical observations and policy options
在前述和后续的讨论中，我们用计量经济学定义了美国的3.5?年和中国的3年经济短周期。正是因为经济周期的潮涨与潮落，我们观察到各国宏观经济变量波动的相似性和同时性。周期似乎围绕其既定的趋势有节奏地波动。我们不用过分纠结美国短周期和中国短周期之间的两个季度的差异，因为周期不可能像石英闹钟那样精。
In the preceding and subsequent discussions, we used econometrics to define the United States by 3.5? The three-year short-cycle of the economy of China. It is precisely because of the ups and downs of the economic cycle that we have observed the similarities and parallels in the volatility of macroeconomic variables across countries. The cycles seem to be moving in rhythm around their established trends. We do not have to dwell too much on the difference between the short-cycle of the United States and the short-cycle of China, because the cycles cannot be as sophisticated as the alarm clock.
康德拉季耶夫在他开创性的著作《经济的长波》中讨论了短/中周期与长周期之间的差异。他似乎不同意一些批评者的看法，即中周期是由资本主义制度推动的，并受到“偶然的，经济以外的情况和事件的催化，例如：1）技术的进步; 2）战争和革命; 3）新国家融入世界经济和4）黄金生产的波动。”相反，他认为这些看起来改变了历史进程的变化其实是周期内生的。
Kondradiyev discusses the difference between short/medium and long cycles in his pioneering book, Long Waves of the Economy. He does not seem to agree with some critics that the medium cycle is driven by the capitalist system and is “accidentally driven by circumstances and events outside the economy, such as: 1) advances in technology; 2) wars and revolutions; 3) integration of new countries into the world economy; and 4) fluctuations in gold production.” On the contrary, he argues that these changes that seem to have changed the course of history are actually born within the cycle.
例如，技术进步可能在周期转折点之前几年就已经产生，但在不利的经济条件下新技术并不能立即投入使用；战争和革命可能是争夺稀缺资源以发展经济的结果；随着旧世界需求的扩张加剧了开辟新市场的渴望，而新世界也随之渐渐地融入旧世界；黄金产量的增加是经济扩张带来的货币需求增加的结果。
For example, technological advances may have occurred several years before the turning point of the cycle, but new technologies cannot be put into use immediately in unfavourable economic conditions; wars and revolutions may be the result of competition for scarce resources to develop the economy; as the expansion of demand in the old world exacerbates the desire to open new markets, the new world is gradually integrating into the old world; and the increase in gold production is the result of increased monetary demand as a result of the expansion of the economy.
这些猜想有充分论证的理由和实际观察，并有助于清楚地认识近年来的经验。中国2014?年为棚户区改造释放流动性、2015?年中国市场泡沫、2016?年特朗普赢得美国总统选举以及因中国的供给侧改革，商品价格自2016?年以来的复苏，以及日益升级的贸易战都有可能是资本主义制度内生的。虽然这些历史性事件对市场产生了深远的影响，但经济周期不同阶段的、不同供需形态以及它们对市场价格的影响都有助于人们观察并解释这些事件。与市场价格同步的情绪波动可能会引起我们对这些事件的关注。
While these historical events have had far-reaching effects on markets, the different supply and demand patterns of the economic cycle and their impact on market prices have helped to observe and explain these events. The mood swings that have kept pace with market prices may have drawn our attention to these events.
如是，随着美国3.5?年的短周期在下穿7?年中周期前冲顶，特朗普在贸易摩擦的谈判中会更加肆无忌惮、义无反顾，并最终将导致暂时貌似强大、刀枪不入的美国市场回落。同时，美国短周期的这种拐点可能会让当前普遍看涨的市场共识措手不及，因此导致意外的重大调整。最终，中国3?年短周期的减速阶段将把美国经济顺道也带下来。
For example, with America’s short-cycle 3.5? The mid-year cycle runs through seven?
图10：量化的美国经济短周期与各宏观经济变量的比较。美国经济的短周期已经见顶。
Figure 10 : Quantified comparison of short-term cycles of the United States economy with macroeconomic variables. The short-term cycles of the United States economy are over.
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